- DATE 2021 became a virtual conference due to the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic (click here for more details)
Taking into consideration the continued erratic development of the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying restrictions of worldwide travelling as well as the safety and health of the DATE community, the Organizing Committees decided to host DATE 2021 as a virtual conference in early February 2021. Unfortunately, the current situation does not allow a face-to-face conference in Grenoble, France.
The Organizing Committees are working intensively to create a virtual conference that gives as much of a real conference atmosphere as possible.
IP4_3 Interactive Presentations
Date: Wednesday, 03 February 2021
Time: 09:00 - 09:30
Interactive Presentations run simultaneously during a 30-minute slot. Additionally, each IP paper is briefly introduced in a one-minute presentation in a corresponding regular session
|IP4_3.1||FEEDING THREE BIRDS WITH ONE SCONE: A GENERIC DUPLICATION BASED COUNTERMEASURE TO FAULT ATTACKS
Jakub Breier, Silicon Austria Labs, AT
Anubhab Baksi1, Shivam Bhasin2, Jakub Breier3, Anupam Chattopadhyay4 and Vinay B. Y. Kumar1
1Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, SG; 2Temasek Laboratories, Nanyang Technological University, SG; 3Silicon Austria Labs, AT; 4Nanyang Technological University, SG
In the current world of the Internet-of-things and edge computing, computations are increasingly performed locally on small connected systems. As such, those devices are often vulnerable to adversarial physical access, enabling a plethora of physical attacks which is a challenge even if such devices are built for security. As cryptography is one of the cornerstones of secure communication among devices, the pertinence of fault attacks is becoming increasingly apparent in a setting where a device can be easily accessed in a physical manner. In particular, two recently proposed fault attacks, Statistical Ineffective Fault Attack (SIFA) and the Fault Template Attack (FTA) are shown to be formidable due to their capability to bypass the common duplication based countermeasures. Duplication based countermeasures, deployed to counter the Differential Fault Attack (DFA), work by duplicating the execution of the cipher followed by a comparison to sense the presence of any effective fault, followed by an appropriate recovery procedure. While a handful of countermeasures are proposed against SIFA, no such countermeasure is known to thwart FTA to date. In this work, we propose a novel countermeasure based on duplication, which can protect against both SIFA and FTA. The proposal is also lightweight with only a marginally additional cost over simple duplication based countermeasures. Our countermeasure further protects against all known variants of DFA, including Selmke, Heyszl, Sigl’s attack from FDTC 2016. It does not inherently leak side-channel information and is easily adaptable for any symmetric key primitive. The validation of our countermeasure has been done through gate-level fault simulation.
|IP4_3.2||SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK ON RAINBOW POST-QUANTUM SIGNATURE
Petr Socha, Czech TU in Prague, CZ
David Pokorný, Petr Socha and Martin Novotný, Czech TU in Prague, CZ
Rainbow, a layered multivariate quadratic digital signature, is a candidate for standardization in a competition-like process organized by NIST. In this paper, we present a CPA side-channel attack on the submitted 32-bit reference implementation. We evaluate the attack on an STM32F3 ARM microcontroller, successfully revealing the full private key. Furthermore, we propose a simple masking scheme with minimum overhead.